Employment, Sexual Orientation and Religious Beliefs: Do Religious Educational Institutions have a Protected Right to Discriminate in the Selection and Discharge of Employees? by Mawdsley, Ralph D.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Law Faculty Articles and Essays Faculty Scholarship
2011
Employment, Sexual Orientation and Religious
Beliefs: Do Religious Educational Institutions have
a Protected Right to Discriminate in the Selection
and Discharge of Employees?
Ralph D. Mawdsley
Cleveland State University, r.mawdsley@csuohio.edu
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Education Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Sexuality and the
Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Law Faculty Articles and Essays by an authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact
research.services@law.csuohio.edu.
Repository Citation
Mawdsley, Ralph D., "Employment, Sexual Orientation and Religious Beliefs: Do Religious Educational Institutions have a Protected
Right to Discriminate in the Selection and Discharge of Employees?" (2011). Law Faculty Articles and Essays. 687.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles/687
EMPLOYMENT, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, AND 
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS: Do RELIGIOUS EDUCATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS HAVE A PROTECTED RIGHT TO 
DISCRIMINATE IN THE SELECTION AND DISCHARGE 
OF EMPLOYEES? 
Ralph D. Mawdsley* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The life blood of religious educational institutions is their 
doctrinal statements and codes of conduct that set standards 
for employee and student life. The purpose of this paper is to 
examine the freedom of religious educational institutions to 
make employment decisions related to three homosexuality-
related areas: sexual orientation, same-sex sexual activity 
outside marriage, and same-sex marriage. At the core of the 
discussion is the basic question whether religious educational 
institutions have a protected right to enforce doctrinal 
statements or codes of conduct addressing one or more of these 
areas. 
This paper will examine legal issues related to the ability of 
religious educational institutions to declare and enforce their 
religious beliefs regarding same-sex relationships. This 
discussion involves a balancing of important interests. On one 
side is the interest of government in prohibiting discrimination, 
retaliation, and harassment against persons engaged in 
protected activity. On the other side are the free exercise, free 
speech and expressive association rights of religious 
educational institutions to express and enforce their religious 
beliefs. 
* Ralph D. Mawdsley, .J.D., Ph.D., is Professor and the Roslyn Z. Wolf Endowed Chair 
in Urban Educational Leadership at Cleveland State University, Cleveland, Ohio. 
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II. MARRIAGE AS A RELIGIOUS BELIEF 
Religious educational institutions routinely make 
employment decisions relating to religious beliefs. Depending 
on the nature of the beliefs, those decisions may be grounded in 
immutable theological principles found in doctrinal statements 
or in codes of conduct addressing appropriate relationships 
between employees and their work, their students, and their 
families. 1 While religious beliefs in doctrinal statements, such 
as the Trinity, inerrancy of Scripture, and the virgin birth, are 
considered to be the theological bedrock of a religious 
institution, codes of conduct are the moral compass for day-by-
day living. Both are equally important and relevant in defining 
the religious beliefs of an educational institution. For the 
purpose of this paper, doctrinal statements and codes of 
conduct will be considered to be equally important in framing 
the religious nature of a religious educational institution. 
Thus, the question concerning homosexuality and religious 
beliefs is whether either a doctrinal statement or a code of 
conduct addresses issues relating to one or more of the three 
homosexuality-related areas-sexual orientation, sexuality 
activity outside marriage, and same-sex marriage. While a 
cognizable argument can be made for including different-sex 
marriage as a fundamental religious belief in a doctrinal 
statement,Z few educational institutions appear to have done so 
and have chosen instead to address only out-of-wedlock sexual 
activity.3 
1. Codes of conduct can be extraordinarily broad and can include not only 
acceptable movies, music and clothing, but appropriate course content. 
2. See Genesis 2:24 ("Therefore shall a man shall leave his Father and Mother 
and shall cleave to his wife and they shall one flesh."); f~phesians 5:25 ("Husbands, love 
your wives even as Christ loved the church and gave himself for it."); Exodus 20:11 
("Thou shall not commit adultery."); 1 Thessalonians 1::3-1 ("For this is the will of God, 
even your sanctification, that ye should abstain from fornication: That every one of you 
should know how to possess his vessel in sanctification and honor."). Fornication 
includes any physical intimacy outside marriage including both homost~xuality and any 
cohabitation or living together outside marriage. For reference to same-sex 
relationships, see Romans 1:21-:!2. 
3. For an extensive statement of religious beliefs, albeit one not mentioning 
marriage, see the Doctrinal Statement for Liberty University, which advertises itself as 
"the world's largest Christian university." The only veiled rcfcnmce to relationships is 
in the LU Distinctives where the University prohibits certain, "Behavioral standards .. 
. including the prohibition of drug, alcohol and tobacco use, cued residence halls, and 
sexual promiscuity." (emphasis added) Liberty University Distinctivf's, LIIIERTY 
UNIVERSITY, https:l/www.liberty.edu/index.cfm?l'ID=6909 (last visited Sept. 5, 2010). 
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As will be seen from the following legal discussion in this 
article, religious educational institutions have two major 
responsibilities if they are to be successful in enforcing their 
religious beliefs. First, they must have a clear understanding of 
the theological and moral beliefs of their institutions. Second, 
they must have an organized program of orientation for 
imparting these beliefs to employees (and students). Legal 
protection for religious beliefs will occur either through 
statutory exemptions or through constitutional rights. 
III. RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND STATUTORY EXEMPTIONS 
In April 2009, a Florida religious school teacher's contract 
was terminated following the disclosure, during her request for 
maternity leave, that while employed as a teacher she had 
conceived a child three weeks prior to her marriage. Allegedly 
notified in her termination letter that she was being dismissed 
for "fornication" pursuant to a school morals clause requiring 
employees to "maintain and communicate the values and 
purpose of [a religious elementary/secondary school]," the 
teacher responded by engaging an attorney. Her attorney 
expressed the teacher's claim under a state statute prohibiting 
marital status discrimination4 as follows, "If they (school 
officials) [are] going to single her out because she conceived 
prior to marriage, but allow people to remain employed who 
conceived during marriage, isn't that discriminating against 
her based on her marital status?"5 In effect, the dispute arises 
between conduct the religious employer considers to be morally 
reprehensible (fornication) and conduct the dismissed teacher 
considers to be protected under a state statute prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of marital status. 
Although lacking in detail, the facts of the dispute indicate 
how legal rights can be used in creative ways to challenge 
religious beliefs that clergy and governing bodies in religious 
educational institutions may have thought were manifestly 
clear. While not addressing homosexuality under any of the 
three same-sex areas, the facts do expose legal trip wires 
1. See FLA. STAT. § 760.10 (2001) (prohibiting employment discrimination under 
a variety of categories, including marital status). 
5. Fla. Christian School Fires Teacher Ouer 'Fornication' Claims, 
FOXNEWS.COM. Jun. 9, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/us/201 0/06/09/fla-christian-
school-fires- teacher-fornication -claims/. 
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encountered when claims are made under statutes prohibiting 
discrimination. 
Defenses available to religious educational institutions 
when charged with discrimination fall into two broad 
categories: statutory exemptions and constitutional rights. 
While many states prohibit discrimination based on sexual 
orientation, the federal government has yet to legislate such 
protection. Nonetheless, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,6 the workhorse of discrimination litigation, contains 
exemptions applying to religious institutions which would, 
presumably, also protect those institutions if Title VII were 
amended to include sexual orientation. 
Title VII contains three exemptions applicable to religious 
educational institutions. The first exempts employment 
decisions where "religion IS a bona fide occupational 
qualification [BFOQ] of that particular business or 
enterprise."7 The second exempts religious institutions where 
"the curriculum of such [institution] is directed toward the 
propagation of a particular religion."g The third exempts 
religious institutions where employment by a religious 
educational institution of persons of a particular religion is 
necessary "to perform work connected with the carrying on by 
such ... educational institution ... of its activities."9 
While these exemptions appear quite exhaustive, federal 
courts frequently are called upon to determine whether 
religious beliefs (relating to BFOQ, curriculum, activities) 
should be exempt where they otherwise discriminate against 
other protected categories. In Vigars v. Valley Christian Center 
of Dublin, 10 a California federal district court held that a 
religious school librarian-discharged for an out-of-wedlock 
pregnancy by the person who eventually become her second 
husband, but occurring while she was still married to her first 
husband-was entitled to go to trial under a Title VII gender 
discrimination claim. The librarian had received a handbook 
6. Title Vll makes it unlawful "to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2010). 
7. /d. § 2000e-2(c)(1). 
8. !d. § 2000c-2(c)(2). 
9. !d.§ 2000c-l(a). 
10. 805 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
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that "detailed the school's and church's mission, her role in that 
mission as mentor and role model, and repeatedly stressed that 
employees of the school were required to live a life in 
conformity with the fundamentalist beliefs of the church." 11 
The school's effort to justify the discharge initially on the basis 
of pregnancy out-of-wedlock and then, on appeal, to use the 
religious grounds of adultery, prompted the district court to 
note that, even though "defendants' dislike of pregnancy 
outside of marriage stem[ed] from a religious belief may be 
relevant to the Court's First Amendment analysis, it [did] not 
automatically exempt the termination decision from Title VII 
scrutiny." 12 The court found that neutral, generally applicable 
prohibition of gender discrimination under Title VII preempted 
defendants' use of the Free Exercise Clause 13 where "only 
women can ever be fired for being pregnant without benefit of 
marriage," 14 but the court went on to note that had the school 
raised only the adultery charge, such would have been 
"determinative of whether Title VII applies to this case." 15 In 
this judicial dividing-the-baby analysis, the federal district 
court observed that not all religious beliefs will be enforced 
equally. Other courts have taken the same approach as in 
Vigars, noting that employee discharge for "[engaging in] pre-
marital sexual intercourse in violation of [a school's] moral 
code" would not be a Title VII discrimination violation, while a 
discharge based on pregnancy would be a violation. 16 Thus, 
while courts expound the dogma that "[i]nquiry by the courts 
into the religious faith required by a religious organization of 
its employees is constitutionally barred," 17 courts can, and do, 
11. ld. at 801. The district court rejected the school"s "bona fide occupational 
qualification [BFOQJ" Title VII exemption (20 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (2010)) in terms of 
the librarian being a "role model" where "there [was] a serious disagreement about how 
central her moral life was to her job as librarian, whether or not she was truly expected 
to act as a role model ... and what impact her pregnancy truly had on her ability to 
perform either of those functions." !d. at 809. 
12. !d. at 808. 
13. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 191 U.S. 872, 880 (1990) (upholding state's denial of 
unemployment compensation to two former state employees fired for using the banned 
drug peyote, allegedly for religious purposes, where the state statute criminalizing the 
usc of peyote was a "neutral, generally applicable regulatory law"). 
11. Vigars, 805 F. Supp. at 8(11. 
15. ld.at810. 
16. E.g, Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 48:3 F. Supp. 266,270 (N.D. Iowa 1980). 
17. Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 941, 9-17 (:3d Cir.l991). 
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inquire into whether marriage-related employment criteria are 
implemented in a manner that is prohibited under Title VII. 18 
Other Title VII cases involving marriage issues have 
involved, as discussed above, the same kind of balancing of 
religious beliefs with Title VII's prohibition of protected 
category discrimination. In Little u. Wuerl, 19 the teaching 
contract of a Protestant teacher in a Catholic school was not 
renewed "because she had remarried ... without pursuing the 
'proper canonical process available from the Roman Catholic 
Church to obtain validation of her second marriage."'20 The 
Cardinal's Clause, in effect at the teacher's school, required 
the dismissal of [a] teacher for serious public immorality, 
public scandal or public rejection of the official teachings, 
doctrine or laws of the Catholic Church. Examples of the 
violation of this clause would be the entry by a teacher into a 
marriage which ~s not recognized by the Catholic 
Church ... . 21 
The Third Circuit, relying on a Title VII exemption for 
religious educational institutions whose practices are "directed 
toward the propagation of a particular religion,"22 ruled in 
Little that the school's having hired plaintiff knowing that she 
was a Protestant had not served to waive the exemption as to 
the school's enforcement of its religious beliefs concerning 
marriage. The school in Little clearly benefited from a 
statement of its religious beliefs regarding marriage and 
changed the whole focus of the decision from discrimination to 
the terms of the employee's contract. 
18. Compare Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.:ld 651, 6G6 (Gth Cir. 2000) 
(emphasizing that, where a female employee is discharged or nonrenewed for 
premarital sex, her prima facie case requires only that she produce evidence that, 
apart from the premarital sex issue, "she was meeting [her employer's] legitimate 
expectations;" the burden then shifts to the school to produce evidence of its religious 
beliefs as a nondiscriminatory basis for its decision; whether employee is able to 
produce evidence that the proffered reason is pretextual will affect the outcome of the 
case, but is not part of the employee's prima facie case) with Boyd v. Harding Acad. of 
Memphis, 88 F.:id 410 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding summary judgment for a religious 
school regarding its termination of an unmarried pregnant preschool teacher where the 
teacher was not able to refute the school's nondiscriminatory reason for discharge in 
that it enforced its anti-adultery policy against both males and females). 
19. 929 F.2d 94-1 (ad Cir. 1991). 
20. !d. at 916. 
21. !d. 
22. 12 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (2010). 
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The Title VII religious exemptions have protected religious 
educational institutions' enforcement of religious beliefs in 
cases not directly related to marriage. For example, in Curay-
Cramer u. Ursuline Academy of Wilmington, Delaware, Inc}3 
the Third Circuit upheld, against a claim of gender 
discrimination, the discharge of a female Catholic school 
teacher who had signed a public pro-abortion advertisement in 
a local newspaper, reasoning that "the pro-choice 
advertisement was not protected conduct under Title VII's 
opposition clause."24 In effect, in the absence of an allegation 
that male employees had attacked the Catholic Church's 
position on abortion and had been punished differently, a court 
would be called upon to determine whether "the repudiation of 
Catholic doctrine on when life begins and the responsibility to 
preserve life in utero"25 violates Catholic doctrine, something 
that "would infringe upon the First Amendment Religion 
clauses."26 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit upheld, against a 
claim of gender discrimination, the refusal of a Catholic 
university to hire a female Catholic with strong pro-abortion 
views for a theology position, reasoning that the same result 
would have occurred for a male applicant.27 In Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission u. Mississippi College,28 
the Fifth Circuit limited jurisdiction of the EEOC to inquire 
into a Baptist institution's refusal to hire a Presbyterian, 
female part-time instructor for a full-time position where the 
College was owned by the state Baptist convention, the 
College's employment requirements specified hiring of Baptists 
23. 150 F.:3d 1 ao, 112 (:ld Cir. 2006) (Curay-Cramer /I) (rejecting Title VII claims 
hy terminated female Catholic school teacher and rejecting gender discrimination 
based on male employees in the past having heen treated less severely for other kinds 
of violations, the Third Circuit reasoning that "comparable conduct [must he] 
sufficiently similar to avoid raising substantial [First Amendment Religious Clauses] 
constitutional questions."). 
21. Jd. 
25. Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., :!11 F. Supp. 2d 
92:3, 931 (D. Del. 20(J1) (Curay-Cramer [). 
26. Curay-Cramer 11, 150 F.:ld at 110. 
27. Maguire v. Marquette Univ., 811 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir. 1987). 
28. 626 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1980) (while not resolved on the merits, the Fifth 
Circuit was clear that on remand the EEOC, once it had determined that the College 
had a religion-based employment requirement, could not inquire further into other 
discrimination claims). 
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except in situations where none were available for critical 
areas, and 95% of the faculty was Baptist.29 
One final exemption exists, although it takes its force from 
the Free Exercise Clause rather than statutory exemptions. 
Religious schools and universities can claim a ministerial 
exemption under the Free Exercise Clause in making 
employment decisions even though those decisions are 
discriminatory, the rationale being that courts cannot inquire 
into an institution's qualifications for those who perform 
religious functions. However, this exemption is very narrowly 
defined.30 
Religious exemptions from state nondiscrimination statutes 
can involve difficult interpretative questions, not significantly 
different from those under Title VII. In a student case, Romeo 
u. Seton Hall Uniuersity, 31 a New Jersey appeals court held 
that a Catholic university that denied recognition of a student 
gay and lesbian group was not prohibited from doing so by the 
state's nondiscrimination statute. New Jersey has a broad 
nondiscrimination statute prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of a variety of categories, including "sexual orientation,"32 
in "any college and university"33 but exempting from that 
statute "any educational facility operated or maintained by a 
bona fide religious or sectarian institution."34 Two judicial 
observations regarding the facts of this case are worth noting. 
First, the state appeals court observed that the university's 
broad nondiscrimination provision, prohibiting discrimination 
in employment and student programs in a variety of areas 
including sexual orientation,35 cannot be read as a contractual 
29. The Fifth Circuit in Mississippi Colle!fe relied on the Title VII exemption 
where "the employment of individuals of a particular religion [is necessaryj to perform 
work connected with the carrying on by such ... educational institution ... of its 
activities." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (a) (2010). 
30. Compare Hedhead v. Conf. of Seventh-day Adventists, -140 F. Supp. 2d 211 
(E.D.N. Y. 2006) (finding that termination of pregnant female not protected by 
ministerial exemption where teacher's duties were secular in nature) with Petruska v. 
Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006) (ministerial exemption applied in gender 
discrimination claim where plaintiffs position was that of a chaplain at a religious 
university). 
31. 875 A.2d 1013 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). 
32. N .• J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-::l (West 2006). 
::3:3. Jd. § 1 0:5-5(1). 
34. /d. 
35. Romeo, 875 A2d at 1048. The university's nondiscrimination provision is a 
fairly standard one: "No person may be denied employment or related benefits or 
admission to the University or to any of its programs or activities, either academic or 
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exemption from the state statute. In distinguishing 
nondiscrimination contract provisions in employment from 
student organizations, the appeals court refused to recognize a 
nondiscrimination provision creating a unilateral contract for 
students and, even if such were to exist, the provision in the 
Seton Hall Student Handbook declared that student clubs, 
organizations, and associations could only be formed that 
"respect[ed] the values and mission of the University."36 
Second, the court held that "a private religious university's 
values and mission must be left to the discretion of the 
university."37 The plaintiff students' emphasis on forming an 
organization directed at one protected class amounted to a 
"reductionist reference to ... sexual orientation"38 which was 
inconsistent with the Church's position "that every person has 
a fundamental Identity: the creature of God, and by grace, his 
child and heir to eternallife."39 
While the appeals court in Romeo ruled in favor of the 
university, it did not paint with a broad brush. Even though a 
nondiscrimination provision (that included sexual orientation) 
in a student handbook might not be considered the basis of a 
unilateral contract for purposes of enforcing the 
nondiscrimination provision against a religious university, 
such would not necessarily be the case in an employment 
handbook. The Romeo appeals court found that, in the absence 
of a language indicating a religious employer's 
nondiscrimination employment provision is not binding, "a 
manual's provisions on job security constitutes a binding 
contract between the employer and the employee .... A policy 
manual that provides for job security grants an important, 
fundamental protection for workers. If such a commitment is 
indeed made, obviously an employer should be required to 
honor it."40 Thus, in a state such as New Jersey that exempts 
religious colleges and universities from its state law 
nondiscrimination statute, a college or university employee 
nonacademic, curricular or extracurricular, because of race, color, religion, age, 
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, handicap and disability, or veteran's 
status." /d. at 1016. 
::!6. /d. at 1049. 
::!7. !d. at 1050. 
:~s. I d. 
::!9. /d. 
10. /d. at 1018. 
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handbook that prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation would be sufficient to constitute an enforceable 
contract. One could reasonably anticipate that, if a religious 
college or university included sexual orientation in its 
nondiscrimination provision and then sought to deny benefits 
to same-sex married employees that were available to opposite-
sex married employees, or otherwise sought to discharge a 
current employee who had recently entered into a same-sex 
marriage, the statutory exemption would no longer apply to the 
religious educational institution.41 
Most states also have nondiscrimination statutes similar to 
Title VII with a provision, such as the one in the case at the 
beginning of this section, prohibiting discrimination on the 
basis of marital status. In Parker-Bigaback u. St. Labre 
School,42 the Supreme Court of Montana interpreted its 
marital status provision as not applying to the school's 
termination of a teacher living with a man not at that time her 
husband43 in violation of Catholic religious beliefs. The school's 
employment contract contained a provision not addressing 
marriage directly but declaring that employees agreed 
[t]o conform to and abide by all of the moral and religious 
teachings and beliefs of the Roman Catholic Church and not 
to engage in any personal conduct or lifestyle which would be 
at variance with or contrary to the policies of the school and 
the Diocese of Great Falls-Billings or the moral and religious 
teachings of the Roman Catholic Church. 44 
In resolving the case in favor the school, the Montana 
Supreme Court determined that "[t]his case is not about 
marital status or gender. It is about conduct which [the 
11. But see Egan v. Hamline United Methodist Chur~h. 679 N.W.2d cl50 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2004) (finding, in a case not involving marriage, that Minnesota's 
nondiscrimination statute's religious exemption applied to discharge of gay organist, 
and determining that the church's Personnel Handbook prohibiting discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation did not constitute a waiver of the statutory exemption, 
the appeals court reasoning that such a result avoided an Establishment Clause 
problem). For another case involving Minnesota's Human Rights Act and reaching the 
same ~onclusion as Egan, see Thorson v. Billy Graham Evangelistic Ass'n, 6il7 N.W.2d 
652 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
42. 7 P.3d 361 (Mont. 2000). 
13. The facts in the case arc not clear, but apparently plaintiff was married to her 
husband from 1974 to 1984 and remarried him in 1995 after her termination. Thus, 
plaintiff appeared to have been living with her former husband at the time of her 
termination even though they were divor~ed. See id. at :l6:i. 
44. !d. at :l63-64. 
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employee] agreed to avoid when she signed her employment 
agreement with St. Labre School."45 By deftly shifting the issue 
from marital status to adulterous conduct, the court 
determined that whether the employee was married or single 
"made no difference .... If she had cohabited with someone of 
the opposite sex to whom she was not married, the same result 
would have occurred."46 
Judicial recognition in Vigars and Parker-Bigaback of a 
religious claim to support employee termination for adultery 
finds some traction in states that still continue to criminalize 
adultery.47 However, as applied to same-sex relationships the 
statutes may be subject to ambiguity in interpretation or, even 
more seriously, to the law of unintended consequences. For 
example, the state of North Dakota declares that "[a] married 
person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if he or she engages 
in a sexual act with another person who is not his or her 
spouse,"48 but does not specify whether a spouse must be a 
person of a different gender. Oklahoma defines adultery as the 
"the unlawful voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person 
45. /d. at 364. 
16. /d. 
17. See, e.g., Alabama: ALA. CollE§ JilA-13-2 (2005) ("A person commits adultery 
when he engages in sexual intercourse with another person who is not his spouse and 
lives in cohabitation with that other person when he or that other person is married" 
can be punished under a Class B misdemeanor.); Georgia: GA. CoDE ANN. § 16-6-19 
(2007) ("A married person commits the offense of adultery when he voluntarily has 
sexual intercourse with a person other than his spouse" can be punished with a 
misdemeanor.); Illinois: 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-7 (2010) ("Any person who has 
sexual intercourse with another not his spouse commits adultery, if the behavior is 
open and notorious, and (1) The person is married and the other person involved in 
such intercourse is not his spouse; or (2) The person is not married and knows that the 
other person involved in such intercourse is married" can be punished under a Class A 
misdemeanor.); Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., CRJM. LAW § 10-501 (LexisNexis 2009) 
(declaring that "A person may not commit adultery" and upon being found guilty of the 
misdemeanor of adultery the person "shall be fined $10"); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 615::3 (2007) ("A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, being a 
married person, he engages in sexual intercourse with another not his spouse or, being 
unmarried, engages in sexual intercourse with another known by him to he married."); 
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7- lOil (LexisNexis 2008) ("A married person commits 
adultery when he voluntarily has sexual intercourse with a person other than his 
spouse [and is guilty of] a class B misdemeanor."); Virginia: VA. CoDE ANN.§ 18.2<365 
(2009) ("Any person, being married, who voluntarily shall have sexual intercourse with 
any person not his or her spouse shall he guilty of adultery, punishable as a Class 4 
misdemeanor."); Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. § 911.16 (2005) (finding a first class felony for 
"[aj married person who has sexual intercourse with a person not the married person's 
spouse; or [aj person who has sexual intercourse with a person who is married to 
another"). 
18. N.D. CENT. COllE§ 12.1-20-09 (1997). 
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with one of the opposite sex,"49 language suggesting that same-
sex partners married in another state who engage in same-sex 
sexual conduct in the state of Oklahoma could not be 
prosecuted for adultery. The effect of these statutes, one can 
argue, is that while they provide some insight into a public 
policy of fidelity in marriage, they should not take the place of 
religious institutions creating their own definitions of 
marriage.50 
IV. RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
Where the religion-based claims of religious educational 
institutions are not protected by state nondiscrimination 
statutes, the ultimate question is whether the institutions are 
entitled to protect their religious beliefs under federal 
constitutional provisions. The most frequently litigated 
constitutional protections are all found in the First 
Amendment: 5 1 Free Exercise of Religion Clause, Establishment 
Clause, and the Free Speech Clause (including right of 
expressive association). 
Federal courts have uniformly held an inquiry can be made 
into whether a religious educational institution's claim that its 
discrimination is consistent with its religious beliefs or whether 
the claim Is pretextual. 52 However, even if alleged 
19. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 871 (2002). Less clear is South Carolina's statute 
declaring that "[a]ny man or woman who shall be guilty of the crime of adultery or 
fornication shall be liable to indictment and, on conviction, shall he severally punished 
by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars or 
imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than one year or by both fine and 
imprisonment. at the discretion of the court." S.C. Com: i\NN. § 16-15-60 (2009). 
50. Other state statutes touch upon the benefits associated with marriage 
without defining the nature of the marriage partners. See Godfrey v. Spano, 892 
N.Y.S.2d 272 (N.Y. 2009) (upholding state executive order recognizing out-of-state 
same-sex marriages for purposes of qualifying for public health insurance coverage and 
other benefits); Lewis v. N.Y. State Dep't of Civil Serv., 872 N.Y.S.2d 578 (N.Y. i\pp. 
Div. 2009) (refusing to find recognition of same-sex marriages from other states as 
violating New York policies, including that same-sex marriages were not so abhorrent 
to New York public policy as to fall into exception including incestuous and polygamous 
marriages which would prohibit application of marriage recognition rule). 
51. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press .... "). 
52. See Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch .. 7 F.:ld :324 (:3d 
Cir. 1993) (finding no violation of the Religion Clauses where a limited inquiry under 
the i\ge Discrimination in ~;mployment i\ct (29 U.S.C. § 62:3 (2010)) was made to 
determine whether firing a teacher who had been dismissed for marrying contrary to 
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discrimination is consistent with its religious beliefs, a court 
can still determine that compelling public policy arguments 
supersede application of the religious beliefs. 53 
The U.S. Supreme Court's odyssey in balancing 
nondiscrimination with religious beliefs has resulted in 
benchmarks that suggest diminished protection for religious 
beliefs. In Reynolds u. United States, 54 the Court articulated a 
belief-practice dichotomy in upholding a criminal bigamy 
conviction for a person who had alleged that his religious 
beliefs permitted polygamy.55 In a sweeping statement, the 
Court opined that "[l]aws are made for the government of 
actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious 
belief and opinions, they may with practices."56 As a result, the 
Court reasoned that "it is within the legitimate scope of the 
power of every civil government to determine whether 
polygamy or monogamy shall be the law of social life under its 
dominion"57 and, just as government can prohibit religious 
practices such as human sacrifices and wives burning 
themselves on the funeral pyre of their husbands, so also can 
government prohibit polygamy.58 To allow a person to practice 
his religious beliefs in all situations would have the effect of 
"permit[ting] every citizen to become a law unto himself."59 
One hundred five years after Reynolds, the Court was 
called upon to determine whether the Internal Revenue Service 
could revoke the tax exempt status for a religious university,60 
Bob Jones University,61 whose religious beliefs prohibited 
Canon Law had been done according to religious beliefs or was pretextual); DeMarco v. 
Holy Cross High Sch., 1 F.3d 166 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding no Establishment Clause 
violation in applying ADEA to religious school). 
5:3. See Nat'! Relations Labor Bd. v. Catholic Bishop, 110 U .8. 490 (1979) (setting 
forth a framework for analyzing whether federal statutes apply to religious educational 
institutions and, if so, whether the statute can be applied even considering 
constitutional claims). 
51. 98 U.S. 115 (1878). 
55. /d. at 161. 
5G. /d. at 166. 
57. /d. 
58. /d. 
59. /d. at 167. 
60. Rev. Rul. 71-117, 1971-2 C.B. 2:30. The IRS News Release both denied tax 
exempt status to the university and declared that donations to the university would not 
be considered to be chartable for purposes of tax deductions. 
61. 161 U.S. 571 (1983). 
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interracial dating and marriage.62 In upholding revocation of 
the university's tax-exempt status, the Supreme Court opined 
that religious practices could be denied protection where a 
"most fundamental national public policy" was at stake.63 
Similar to the government's interest in Reynolds in 
criminalizing the practice of polygamy, the government's 
"fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial 
discrimination in education"64 in Bob Jones University was so 
supportive of an overwhelming public policy that for the Court 
to have reached any other conclusion would have undercut the 
Court's determination in Brown v. Board of Education65 "that 
racial discrimination in education violates a most fundamental 
national public policy."66 The effect of Bob Jones University is 
much broader than an educational institution's tax exempt 
status; the decision reinforces Reynolds that the enforceability 
of religious beliefs can be overridden by public policy concerns. 
The prominence of public policy in countering religious 
beliefs was examined four years after Bob Jones University in 
Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. 
Georgetown University. 67 In Georgetown University, the District 
of Columbia Court of Appeals, relying on Bob Jones University 
held that "the District of Columbia [had] a compelling or 
overriding governmental interest in the eradication of sexual 
orientation discrimination"68 and in finding that the University 
had violated the District's nondiscrimination statute in 
refusing to recognize a gay and lesbian student group. The 
court of appeals determined that the University's Catholic 
"moral norms," which distinguished between recognizing 
62. See id. at 580-81. 
There is to be no interracial dating 
1. Students who are partners in an interracial marriage will ilP expellc>d. 
2. Students who are members of or affiliated with any group or organization which 
holds as one of its goals or advocates interracial marriage will be expelled. 
:3. Students who date outside their own race will he expelled. 
4. Students who espouse, promote, or encourage others to violate the University's 
dating rules and regulations will he expelled. 
6i3. !d. at 59:3. 
61. ld. at 601. 
65. :317 U.S. 183 (1954). 
66. !d. at 59il (see Court's iteration of cases and statutes eradicating race 
discrimination). 
67. 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987). 
68. !d. at 32. See D.C. CODE§ 2-1401.01(2001) (prohibiting discrimination, among 
other categories, for "marital status, . . . sexual orientation, gender identity or 
expression ... "). 
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homosexual conduct (which it found objectionable) and 
homosexual orientation (which it did not find objectionable), 
would not be burdened by recogmzmg the student 
organization.69 However, while the court of appeals held that 
the University could be required to provide the facilities and 
services available to other student organizations/0 any effort to 
compel the University to "endorse" the gay/lesbian student 
groups would violate the Free Exercise and Free Speech 
Clauses. 71 In language reminiscent of Reynolds, the District of 
Columbia Circuit observed that "government is without power 
to intrude into the domain of the intellect or the spirit and that 
only conduct may be regulated."72 
Both Reynolds and Bob Jones University viewed public 
policy through the protective lens of Free Exercise Clause. 
Although public policy prevailed in Reynolds and Bob Jones 
University, the Free Exercise Clause still became an effective 
counterweight in other cases involving religious beliefs and 
education. 73 However, the vitality and viability of the Free 
Exercise Clause came largely came to an end in 1990 in 
Employment Division v. Smith. 74 In this case, the Supreme 
Court upheld denial of unemployment compensation benefits to 
two state employees who had been dismissed for using a 
prohibited substance, peyote, allegedly during a Native 
American religious ceremony. 75 In rejecting the former 
employees' benefits claim under the Free Exercise Clause, the 
Court acknowledged that exercise of religion applied "not only 
[to] belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention 
69. !d. at 18. 
70. See id. at :31 (the court of appeals acknowledges the University's "all or 
nothing'" position that applied both to endorsement and facilities/services while later 
noting that the latter could be provided without requiring the former). 
71. !d. at 21. 
72. !d. 
73. See Wis. v. Yoder, 106 U.S. 205 (1972). In upholding exemption for Amish 
children from compulsory attendance past grade eight, the Supreme Court observed 
that "courts must move with great circumspection in performing the sensitive and 
delicate task of weighing a State's legitimate social concern when faced with religious 
claims for exemption from generally applicable education requirements." !d. at 285. 
74. 491 U.S. 872 (1990). For an early discussion of the dramatic impact of this 
case on the application of the Free Exercise Clause, see generally Ralph Mawdsley, 
l<Jmployment Division v. Smith Revisited: The Constriction of the Free Exercise Rights 
Under the U.S. Constitution, 76 ED. LAW REP. 1 (1992). 
75. Emp't /Jiu., 191 U.S. at 88il. 
294 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2011 
from) physical acts."76 However, in a sweeping decision, the 
Court took its decisions in Reynolds and Bob Jones University 
one step further and determined that free exercise of religion 
would no longer be a viable defense when dealing with "a 
neutral, generally applicable law."77 After Employment 
Division, the Court recognized that Free Exercise Clause would 
have legal vitality only in two situations: where combined with 
another constitutional provision such as the Free Speech 
Clause or when dealing with facts demonstrating hostility 
towards religion. 7X 
Three years after Employment Division, the Supreme Court 
furnished, in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free 
School District,79 a replacement for the Free Exercise Clause, 
holding that religious speech is a fully protected subset under 
the Free Speech Clause. For the Court in Lamb's Chapel, the 
Free Speech Clause's prohibition of viewpoint discrimination 
became a powerful force in upholding religious beliefs. 
However, the Supreme Court's decision in Christian Legal 
Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings 
College of the Law v. Martinez (CLS)xo has cast a shadow over 
meaning of viewpoint discrimination. The Court was called 
upon to determine whether the law school's nondiscrimination 
requirement for student organizations violated the free speech 
and associational rights of the Christian Legal Society student 
organization that sought to limit membership to persons 
subscribing to its religious beliefs. 81 The law school's policy 
prohibited discrimination in a broad number of categories, 
including "sexual orientation"x2 and required that "registered 
76. !d. at 877. 
77. !d. at 881. 
78. See. e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu i\ye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 
520 (1993) (invalidating city ordinances prohibiting ritual slaughter of animals, finding 
the ordinances to be neither neutral nor of general applicability and finding them to be 
targeted at religious activity). 
79. 508 U.S. 381, ::393 (199:3) (holding that a school district "discriminatl'[dJ on the 
basis of viewpoint to permit school property to be used for the presentation of all views 
about family issues and child rearing except those dealing with the subject matter from 
a religious standpoint"). 
80. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
81. ld. at 2980-81. 
82. !d. at 2979 ("[Hastings] shall not discriminate unlawfully on the basis of race, 
color, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual orientation. This 
nondiscrimination policy covers admission, access and treatment in Hastings-
sponsored programs and activities."). 
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student organizations allow any student to participate, become 
a member, or seek leadership positions in the organization, 
regardless of [her] status or beliefs. X.> In contrast to the Law 
School's "all-comers policy,"84 the CLS bylaws 
required members and officers to sign a "Statement of Faith" 
and to conduct their lives in accord with prescribed principles. 
Among those tenets is the belief that sexual activity should 
not occur outside of marriage between a man and a woman. 
CLS interprets its bylaws to exclude from affiliation anyone 
who engages in "unrepentant homosexual conduct" or holds 
religious convictions different from those in the Statement of 
Faith.xs 
The effect of CLS being denied law school sponsorship was 
that, while it could use law school facilities for meetings and 
activities, access to chalkboards, and availability of bulletin 
boards to announce events, 86 it was denied access to a wide 
range of services, including financial assistance from the law 
school to subsidize events, use of law school channels to 
communicate with students, placing of announcements in a 
weekly Office of Student Affairs newsletter, use of the law 
school logo, and participation in a student organizations fair 
designed to advance recruitment efforts. 87 
Choosing to merge the Supreme Court's separate lines of 
free speech rights8x and associational right89 cases, the CLS 
sa. /d. at 2982. 
84. /d. at 2982 n.5. 
85. /d. at 2974. CLS is a national organization that imposes the same religious 
requirements on all law school CLS chapters. On the organization's webpage, the CLS 
Board of Directors has adopted a Resolution amending its Statement of Faith on "Faith 
and Sexual Morality Standards"; however, this amendment currently can be accessed 
only by its members. CHHISTIAN LEGAL SOCJF:TY, http://www.clsnet.org (last visited 
Sept. 1. 2010). 
86. CLS, 1:!0 S. Ct. at 2981. 
87. /d. at 2979. The Court minimiws the impact of denying these benefits to CLS 
in that "students [can] communicate through email, websites, and hosts like MySpace." 
/d. at 2991. 
88. For three key cases relying on free expression, see Bd. of Regents of Univ. of 
Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) (finding facially invalid university 
policy permitting student groups to be defunded on the basis of a student vote); 
J{osenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (finding 
impermissible viewpoint discrimination when university refused to provide the same 
printing privileges to a student religious group that it had provided to nonreligious 
student !,'TOups); Widmar v. Vincent, 151 U.S. 26::3 (1981) (invalidating university 
refusal to permit student religious group to meet on university premises on the basis of 
a university policy refusing religious groups to meet). 
89. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 5:30 U.S. 610 (2000) (holding, on an as 
-- ---------
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majority found the College of Law's all-comers policy to be 
"reasonable and viewpoint neutral."90 In response to the CLS 
claim "[t]here can be no diversity of viewpoints in a forum if 
groups are not permitted to form around viewpoints,"91 the 
Court responded that a state restriction on a limited public 
forum "need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable 
limitation."92 Once the Court found that the law school's 
refusal to recognize CLS was reasonable, the student 
organization's free expression claim ceased to be viable under 
Employment Diuision.93 While the Court declared that "[i]t is, 
after all, hard to imagine a more viewpoint-neutral policy than 
one requiring all student groups to accept all comers,"94 the 
Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit to determine 
whether the Law School had "selectively enforce[d] its all-
comers policy."95 
V. ANALYSIS 
As suggested by the above discussion, the definition of 
marriage in religious educational institutions has been framed 
by federal and state courts striving to navigate a path between 
protecting religious beliefs and implementing public policy 
prohibiting discrimination. In Varnum u. Brien,96 the Supreme 
Court of Iowa invalidated a state statute prescribing that 
"[o]nly a marriage between a male and a female is valid."97 
Examining the statute under the Iowa Constitution's equal 
privileges and immunities provision, 98 the state supreme court 
applied basis, that state nondiscrimination statute prohibiting sexual orientation 
discrimination violated Doy Scouts right of expressive association). 
90. CLS, 1:30 S. Ct. at 299::i. 
91. Jd. at 2992. 
92. Id. (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 17:3 U.S. 
788, 808 (1985)). 
9;3. ld. at 2995. 
91. !d. at 299;3. 
95. Id. at 2995. For example, the CLS queried whether student groups formed on 
the basis of race (African American), ethnicity (Hispanic), or gender (women) would 
also be open to full participation by non-blacks, non-Hispanics, or men. Sec Appellant 
Brief at 8-9, CLS Chapter of Hastings Law Sch. v. Martinez. 1 ao S. Ct. 2971 (2010) 
(No. 08-1371) for the CLS view on the Law School's failure to enforce its all comers 
policy uniformly. 
96. 76;3 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
97. lOW A COllE§ 595.2(1) (2009). 
98. lOWA CONST. art. 1, § () ("[Tjhe General Assembly shall not grant to any 
citizen, or class of citi7-ens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms shall 
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applied an intermediate level heightened scrutiny under a 
quasi-suspect standard,99 finding that the statute furthered 
"deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in 
pursuit of some legitimate objective," 100 was based on 
"irrelevant stereotypes and prejudice," 101 was not the kind of 
human trait so "highly resistant to change ... [that] it allowed 
courts to relax their standard of review because the barrier is 
temporary or susceptible to self-help," 102 and addressed a group 
politically powerless to effect changes in the law. 1 03 
Same-sex marriage clearly has become the legal 
frontispiece for discussing sexual orientation issues in general. 
A statutory or judicial pronouncement on homosexuality-
related areas of sexual orientation or marriage is likely to leave 
some religious educational institutions uncertain as to the 
not equally belong to all citizens."). 
99. Sec United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (in adapting the heightened 
scrutiny standard to the constitutionality of the Commonwealth of Virginia's refusal to 
admit women to the Virginia Military Institute, the Court determined that the 
Commonwealth had failed to satisfy the "exceedingly persuasive justification" test in 
order to uphold its admission policy). See also In reMarriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 444-
15 (Cal. 2008) (Supreme Court of California, in invalidating state statute stating that 
"only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California [CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 308.5 (2001)]," held that classification based on sexual orientation was 
subject to "strict scrutiny analysis"); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 
1:32 (Conn. 2008) ("[Wje conclude that, as a minority group that continues to suffer the 
enduring effects of centuries of legally sanctioned discrimination, laws singling them 
out for disparate treatment are subject to heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure that 
those laws are not the product of such historical prejudice and stereotyping."). But see, 
Conaway v. Deane, 9:32 A.2d 571, 609, 616 (Md. 2007) (while holding state statutes 
prohibiting same-sex marriages to be unmnstitutional, state supreme court held "that 
gay and lesbian persons [were not] so politically powerless that they constitute a 
suspect [or quasi-suspect] class"). 
100. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 890. But see Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.:ld 963 
(Wash. 2006) (in upholding state's Defense of Marriage Act [DOMA], the state supreme 
court found that DOMA was rationally related to state's interests in procreation and 
children's well-being, and thus did not violate the privileges and immunities clause). 
101. Varnum, 76:3 N.W.2d at 890. For other jurisdictions adopting the same 
position, see In re Marriage Cases, 18:3 at 415 ("we conclude that in the present 
context, affording same-sex couples access only to the separate institution of domestic 
partnership, and denying such couples access to the established institution of 
marriage, properly must be viewed as impinging upon the right of those couples to 
have their family relationship accorded respect and dignity equal to that accorded the 
family relationship of opposite-sex couples"). 
102. Varnum, 76;) N.W.2d at 891. 
10:3. ld. at 895 (We are convinced gay and lesbian people are not so politically 
powerful as to overcome the unfair and severe prejudice that history suggests produces 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Gays and lesbians certainly possess no 
more political power than women enjoyed four decades ago when the Supreme Court 
began subjecting gender-based legislation to closer scrutiny.). 
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status of their religious beliefs. The notion that 
nondiscrimination statutes may have exemptions for religious 
beliefs is comforting only if the exemption is broad enough to 
include the full range of those beliefs. The challenge with 
statutory exemptions is that they are subject to legislation 
manipulation. In Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints u. Amos, 104 the U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld, against an Establishment Clause challenge, the 
broadening of a Title VII exemption 105 that permitted the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints to extend its 
temple recommend requirement 106 to employees in entities 
owned by the church even though those employees did not 
engage in religious activities. Presumably, if Congress had 
moved in the opposite direction to change the Title VII's 
exemption from all activities to only religious activities, the 
church's religious beliefs would have been adversely affected to 
some extent. 
Similar issues relate to students. If a federal funding 
statute were enacted prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation, would the religious beliefs of religious 
institutions opposing homosexuality or same-sex marriage be 
enforceable? Could the institutions punish students (or faculty) 
expressing views in opposition to religious beliefs and proscribe 
faculty or student organizations opposing the organization's 
religious views? The difficulty is that, in the absence of a 
statutory exemption permitting religious schools and 
universities to enforce otherwise discriminatory rules, 
nondiscrimination statutes, one can argue, would prevail over 
statements of religious beliefs because, as reflected in 
Employment Division and CLS, such statutes would be 
generally applicable and viewpoint neutral. 
101. 18:3 U.S. :327 (1987). 
105. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (1972), where Title VII exempts from coverage the 
employment by religious organizations of persons of a particular religion who are 
required to carry out the organization's "activities" (amended language) rather than 
just "religious activities" (old language), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (1961). 
106. As explained by the Court, a temple recommend is a "certificate that [a person 
is] a member of the Church and eligible to attend its temples .... Temple recommends 
are issued only to individuals who ohserve the Church's standards in such matters as 
regular church attendance, tithing, and abstinence from coffee, tea, alcohol, and 
tobacco." Amos, 18:3 U.S. at :327, :3:30 n.4. 
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The fundamental constitutional challenge to implementing 
religious beliefs is grounded in the belief-practice doctrine of 
Reynolds. To suggest, as Reynolds would have us believe, that 
beliefs and practices are two equally balanced sides of a 
religious institution's statement of its religious beliefs is 
disingenuous. Religion takes form and shape only to the extent 
that it can be practiced. The notion that government should be 
able to regulate the practice of religion because it does not 
probe into persons' minds to change their religious thoughts is 
proverbial strawman logic. We are led to believe that 
government restriction of religious practices is reasonable 
because it affects only one side of the equation. 
However, one can argue that too much legal water has 
flowed over the regulatory dam to change the rules in place to 
deal with discrimination and religious beliefs. The legal 
legacies of Reynolds, Bob Jones University, Employment 
Division, and CLS have served to frame the law, suggesting 
that religious beliefs will have limited impact in defining the 
discrimination debate. 
The dialogue between endorsement and facilitation as 
reflected in CLS and Georgetown University contain the seeds 
of future and, to date, yet unresolved legal disputes. In 
Georgetown University, the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals, in directing the university to provide services and 
facilities to a gay and lesbian rights group, declared that 
"nothing can penetrate the constitutional shield protecting 
against official coercion to remove a religious belief or to 
endorse a principle opposed to that belief." 107 One wonders, 
though, how much assurance a religious educational institution 
can have that permitting same-sex advocates on campus will 
still allow the institution to declare its beliefs on 
homosexuality. Would allowing chaplains and pastors to teach 
and preach the institution's dogma in chapel services and in 
religion courses concerning the sinfulness of homosexuality be 
treated as a form of harassment or retaliation? If so, does such 
an outcome reflect the futility and folly of the belief-practice 
doctrine? 
107. Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 586 
A.2d 1, 25(D.C.1987). 
300 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2011 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Same-sex marriage is a high stakes debate, but one cannot 
help but wonder why, if so much is at stake in terms of 
religious beliefs, so little has been affirmed by religious 
educational institutions. However, even if religious schools and 
universities have clear statements on marriage and religious 
beliefs, one wonders whether those beliefs, in the end, will 
prevail. Should federal protection against sexual orientation 
discrimination be adopted, thus joining existing laws in many 
states, municipalities and public educational institutions 
protecting against sexual orientation and marital status 
discrimination, the refusal to recognize same-sex marriages 
will be difficult to sustain. Once sexual orientation acquires 
protected status, to substitute terms such as civil union for 
marriage is, one can argue, simply another way of perpetuating 
discrimination. 
The same-sex marriage and religious beliefs debate has 
moved forward on three interrelated fronts. First, and most 
broadly, if federal legislation prohibits discrimination based on 
sexual orientation, should a religious exemption be granted for 
religious beliefs that oppose homosexuality? If so, should the 
exemption apply to all aspects of the issue-hiring and 
discharge of gay/lesbian employees, admission or expulsion of 
gay/lesbian students, admission or expulsion of children of 
gay/lesbian couples, discipline of employees or students 
espousing gay/lesbian rights even if not gay or lesbian 
themselves? The Bob Jones University case suggests that 
creation of a fundamental protected status for may leave little 
room to invoke religious beliefs in opposition to that status. 
Second, punishment of sexual activity outside marriage, to 
the extent that different-sex partners are treated the same as 
same-sex partners, would seem to be a safe harbor. However, 
the implications of punishing sexual activity for same-sex 
partners are significantly different, because, while different-sex 
partners have a reference point for legitimizing sexual conduct 
(marriage), such would not be the case for same-sex persons. In 
effect, is marriage for same-sex partners being treated as a 
form of sexual misconduct, thus requiring that homosexual 
persons maintain a life of celibacy, and would such a 
requirement be defensible under nondiscrimination statutes? 
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Third, a religious educational institution's decision to 
punish a same-sex relationship as a marriage can be a slippery 
slope. If the institution lacks a religious belief regarding 
marriage, one can question whether the subject is really a 
matter of a sincerely held religious belief. However, publishing 
a religious belief opposing same-sex marriage could serve to 
increase both the institution's visibility and vulnerability to 
litigation. If sexual orientation receives federal protected status 
comparable to race and gender, one can speculate whether 
denying marriage status to same-sex partners will simply be 
treated as a form of discrimination that depreciates the 
protected status of sexual orientation. 108 
Almost forty years ago, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 109 the Amish 
prevailed in acqmrmg an exemption from the state's 
compulsory attendance statute under the First Amendment's 
Free Exercise Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment's Liberty 
Clause right to direct their children's education. The Court 
reasoned that "[t]he values underlying these two 
[constitutional] provisions relating to religion have been 
zealously protected, sometimes even at the expense of other 
interests of admittedly high social importance." 110 As stunning 
as the Yoder case was at the time, 111 it was limited to "the 
traditional way of life of the Amish [that was] not merely a 
matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious 
conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately 
related to daily living." 112 One can argue that nothing in the 
debate concerning sexual orientation, premarital sexual 
activity, or same-sex marriage rises to the level of the 
protection accorded the Amish way of life in Yoder, and, in light 
of the post- Yoder cases of Bob Jones University, Employment 
Division, and CLS, any constitutional protection for religious 
beliefs opposing same-sex marriage seems doubtful. To quote 
the great religious liberty advocate William Bentley Ball: 
108. For a South African perspective, see Minister of Home Affairs u. Fourie 2006 
(:l) BCLR :l55 (CC) (declaring that, under the South Africa Constitution prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, partners in same-sex unions are 
entitled to have union recognized as a valid marriage). 
109. 106 U.S. 205 (1972). 
110. /d.at211. 
111. See Douglas W. Kmiec, A Review J.;.ssay of Mere Creatures of the State? 
l~ducation, Rclif{ion, and the Courts: A View from the Courtroom, 70 Nonm DAME L. 
REV. 1217, 1268-72 (1995). 
112. Yoder, 106 U.S. at 216. 
